Heraclitus on apollo’s signs and his own:Contemplating oracles and philosophical inquiry by Tor, Shaul
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Tor, S. (2016). Heraclitus on Apollo's signs and his own: contemplating oracles and philosophical inquiry. In E.
Eidinow, J. Kindt, & R. Osborne (Eds.), Theologies of Ancient Greek Religion. (pp. 89-116). Cambridge
University Press.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
[N.B. this is the author’s pre-print version; for the published version, please see: Tor, S. (2016) 
‘Heraclitus on Apollo’s signs and his own: contemplating oracles and philosophical inquiry’, in  
E. Eidinow, J. Kindt and R. Osborne (eds.), Theologies of Ancient Greek Religion. Cambridge, 
89-116.] 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Heraclitus on Apollo’s signs and his own: contemplating oracles and philosophical 
inquiry 
 
Shaul Tor 
 
 
 
This chapter will examine one of Heraclitus’ most arresting theological pronouncements (B93): 
 
ὁ ἄναξ οὗ τὸ µαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σηµαίνει. 
 
The lord whose oracle is the one in Delphi neither says nor conceals but gives a sign. 
 
What kind of theology and theologising are at play in this abstracted and generalised reflection 
about Delphic Apollo and how does this reflection relate to and engage with the more implicit 
theological conceptions of Apollo conveyed in the Delphic traditions (as we find them for 
example in Herodotus)? What exactly is Heraclitus saying about Apollo’s mode of 
communication and what is he implying thereby about his own? If Heraclitus is appropriating 
here the theology of Apolline divination as a framework within which to understand his own 
philosophical inquiry, why does he do so, what is involved in this appropriation and what does 
Apolline philosophical inquiry look like? 
 
Scholarly discussions of B93 share the mostly implicit assumption that what Heraclitus says 
about Apollo is in itself pretty much clear and unproblematic. Commentators take it that 
interpretive difficulties and dilemmas arise once we come to ask what, if anything, the comment 
implies about Heraclitus himself or about anything else. I will argue that Heraclitus’ comment 
about Apollo is pointedly difficult and paradoxical, not only in its implicit ramifications, but 
already on the most rudimentary and literal level of its interpretation. We are meant to be puzzled 
by what Heraclitus says about Apollo and it is an interpretive failure on our part if we are not so 
puzzled. I will suggest that, consequently, Heraclitus’ encapsulation of Apollo’s modus operandi 
is not an unchallenging assertion of a widely familiar point but, on the most rudimentary level of 
its interpretation, a case of creative, involved and unobvious theological abstraction. Arguing 
further that Apollo does indeed serve in B93 as a paradigm of emulation for Heraclitus, I will ask 
how the paradoxical nature of Heraclitus’ theological remark bears on his understanding of his 
own use of language (and on other, related aspects of his thought) and examine the motivations, 
scope and limits of the implicit analogy in B93 between god (Apollo) and mortal (Heraclitus).  
 
 
 
 
 
APOLLO’S PARADOX 
What I find especially paradoxical and difficult about B93 is its striking statement that the lord in 
Delphi ‘does not say’ or ‘speak’ (οὔτε λέγει). Does Apollo not say all sorts of things (statements, 
conditionals, questions, imperatives, interjections, etc.) in his oracles and does he not speak those 
oracles? Nor is the statement that Apollo does not conceal immediately obvious (would we not 
have thought that the lord in Delphi does ‘conceal’?) nor does it (together with the affirmation: 
‘but gives a sign’) instantly elucidate the first negation. By describing the fragment as 
‘paradoxical’ in this way I mean that it frustrates immediate understanding and recognition and 
appears, prima facie, to collide with what we think we know about Apollo. The statement thus 
stops us in our tracks and forces us to think through the remark in a way that will ultimately lead 
to an illuminating insight (or insights), which will account for both our initial assumptions and 
Heraclitus’ initially puzzling statement, but place both in a new light.1  
 
Scholars commonly anticipate the paradoxical force of B93 implicitly, and defuse it in advance, 
by positing (without argument) various over-translations of Heraclitus’ starkly unqualified λέγει. 
So, by way of illustration, we read that Apollo does not ‘indicate clearly,’2 ‘clarify,’3 ‘reveal,’4 
‘assert,’5 ‘declare,’6 ‘speak out,’7 etc.8 I can see no good textual or philological reason to 
suppress what is uncontroversially (I take it), in Archaic Ionic prose as elsewhere, the standard 
sense of the verb: ‘say’ or ‘speak’. The unqualified verb is ubiquitously used to introduce in a 
very general way any kind of meaningful, articulate speech (including not only statements but 
also questions, imperatives etc), with no implicit restriction to a particular clear, direct, 
declarative or outright mode of saying or speaking.9 10 
 
There seem to be two underlying motivations for the common over-translations of λέγει (and, 
more generally, for the attitude to the fragment which these over-translations reflect). First, these 
                                                
1 I draw here on Mackenzie’s analysis of how Heraclitean paradoxes typically work (1988: 3, 16-17, 37; cf. 
1986: 549-550); cf. also Warren 2007: 67-70. While some of Heraclitus’ paradoxes pose common or garden 
observations in such a way as to force one to rethink conventional views (e.g. B60, B61), others, like B93, are 
disorienting and puzzling already on the most rudimentary and literal level of their interpretation (e.g. B32, B62, 
B80). 
2 Robinson 1987: 57. 
3 Mansfeld and Primavesi 2011: 259. 
4 Graham 2010: 177, Kindt 2006: 37. Manetti 1993: 17-18 glosses λέγει as ‘reveal completely’. 
5 Warren 2007: 59. 
6 Kahn 1979: 43. At 123, Kahn writes that οὔτε λέγει denies ‘direct statement’, implying that Apollo does state 
indirectly. 
7 KRS 1983: 209. Marcovich 2001: 51. 
8 Many commentators, of course, translate ‘say’ or ‘speak’, but none, to my knowledge, pick out the paradox I 
address here. Maurizio 2013: 100 is typical of the prevailing attitude in citing the fragment (she translates 
‘declare’) and then proceeding as if the rudimentary and literal sense of Heraclitus’ remark about Apollo is in 
itself self-evident and requires no explication. 
9 Countless passages could of course be cited here. By way of more-or-less arbitrary illustration, cf. Hdt. 4.126: 
πέµψας Δαρεῖος ἱππέα … ἔλεγε τάδε· κτλ. Note that Darius, like Apollo (as we shall presently see), ‘says’ 
things through a go-between and that ἔλεγε introduces in a very broad way questions and imperatives as well as 
assertions. With the appropriate qualifications, the verb can be used to refer to clear, outright and direct speech 
(e.g. λέγουσα … σαφῆ λόγον, Aeschyl. Ag. 1047; ἐνταῦθα δὴ σαφῶς ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι κτλ, Thuc. 8.53) or – just 
as naturally – to an unclear, secretive, indirect or riddling sort of speech (e.g. τάδε µέντοι ὡς κρυπτόµενα 
λέγεται καὶ οὐ σαφηνέως, Hdt. 1.140; ὡς πάντ’ ἄγαν αἰνικτὰ κἀσαφῆ λέγεις, Soph. OT 439 (Oedipus addressing 
the seer Teiresias); οὕτως ἀσαφῶς ἑκάστοτε περὶ αὐτῶν λέγει, Pl. Cratyl. 427d7; ἀόριστα καὶ ἀσαφῆ πειρῶνται 
λέγειν, Aeschin. In Ctesiph. 99.2-3). The unqualified verb indicates very generally the act of making any kind of 
articulate speech, and does not by itself specify a particular way of saying or speaking something. 
10 I will later tentatively suggest that, on a certain level of interpretation, we can relate Heraclitus’ use of λέγει in 
B93 to his term of art logos, but this will not amount to suppressing or eliminating from the account the standard 
sense ‘say’ or ‘speak’. 
more qualified translations save Heraclitus from asserting what may appear to be an obvious 
falsehood. Of course Apollo says things in his oracles, but perhaps he does not say things in a 
direct, outright or clear way. Second, the over-translations make more obvious Heraclitus’ 
reference to the interpretive predicament of Apollo’s consultants as we so often find them in the 
Delphic traditions. Those traditions repeatedly convey the idea that Apollo’s oracles 
communicate in an ambiguous and often figurative manner rather than directly or clearly and, 
therefore, demand circumspect and reflective interpretation. Consultants who naively assume a 
superficial and unreflective interpretation often come to sticky ends and embody a cautionary 
inversion of the proper way to approach Apollo’s oracles. Most famously, Croesus is told that if 
he marches he will destroy a great kingdom (Hdt. 1.53) and mistakenly takes it as read that he 
will destroy the Persians’ kingdom as opposed to his own. Again, Tisamenus is told he ‘will win 
the five greatest contests’ and mistakenly infers that he will win five athletic competitions rather 
than five battles (Hdt. 9.33).11 By having Heraclitus say that Apollo does not assert things in a 
direct, outright and clear way, then, commentators achieve a more obvious reference to this 
familiar point.12 
 
To take the second point first: on the analysis of the fragment which I will defend, Heraclitus 
will still be drawing on and preserving the core theological insight about Apollo’s mode of 
communication and the interpretive predicament of his consultants which the Delphic traditions 
convey. But the way in which Heraclitus’ abstracted and pithy remark encapsulates Apollo’s 
modus operandi in response to these traditions is much more subtle and less obvious than the 
over-translations suggest. We must not be lulled by our familiarity with the Delphic traditions 
into glossing over the precise and difficult way in which Heraclitus puts his point with an 
unchallenging expression of what we take to be their familiar moral. With regard to the first 
point, we should embrace rather than try to suppress the fact that Heraclitus is advancing a 
pointedly surprising and puzzling assertion – although not, on reflection, a blatant falsehood – 
when he says that the lord in Delphi ‘does not say’ (or: ‘speak’).  
 
References to Apollo elsewhere – notably and significantly in Herodotus13 – regularly identify 
the god as the speaker of Delphic oracles, nor is any question raised on this score even when the 
Pythia is expressly specified as the one who voices the oracles.14 At Hdt. 7.141, for example, the 
Pythia issues the Wooden Walls response (ἡ πρόµαντις χρᾷ), and yet Apollo identifies himself 
within the oracle as its speaker (τόδ’ αὖτις ἔπος ἐρέω ἀδάµαντι πελάσσας) and it is him that the 
consultants take themselves to be addressing (ὦναξ).15 This general theological backdrop 
                                                
11 Examples can be multiplied. For similar Delphic traditions in Herodotus, cf. e.g. 1.55 (with 1.91), 4.163-164, 
5.43-45, 6.76-80, 1.165-167, with Maurizio 2013: 111-13; Hölscher 1974: 229-30; cf. also Manetti 1993: 24-29; 
Kindt 2006; Barker 2006. Fontenrose portrays the historical Delphic oracle as essentially a Yes/No answering 
service (1978: esp. 233-35). Parker 2000: 80 with nn.14-15 counters effectively, but we are anyway concerned 
here to relate B93 to the Delphic traditions (and their implicit theology) themselves; on this point, cf. similarly 
Maurizio 2013: 107-108. 
12 The contrast with οὔτε κρύπτει may be another motivation for the over-translations of οὔτε λέγει. I will argue 
that there is a perfectly good contrast in B93 between ‘does not say’ and ‘does not conceal’. At any rate, the 
contrast with οὔτε κρύπτει certainly does not warrant reading a very specific mode of speaking into Heraclitus’ 
pointedly unqualified οὔτε λέγει in such a way as to deflate in advance the paradoxical force of that striking 
negation. 
13 For the principle of looking to Herodotus, who offers the earliest available corpus of (Ionic) prose after 
Heraclitus, as a prime guide for the (especially linguistic) expectations of Heraclitus’ audience, see Kahn 1979: 
92; Graham 2003: 175-76. 
14 Cf. similarly Mikalson 2003: 55, 210; Hollmann 2011: 98, with n.112. 
15 For Apollo identifying himself as speaker of the oracles, cf. e.g. Hdt. 4.157 (n.b. ἐλθόντος – again, a 
masculine participle), 1.47 (οἶδα δ’ ἐγώ κτλ), 1.65-66 (ἐµόν … νηόν), 5.92ε (ἐµὸν δόµον), 6.19, 4.159 (φαµι), 
7.220 (φηµι); cf. also PW 374 (ἐρέω), PW 487 (ἐξ ἐµέθεν χρησµὸν θεοῦ, ὅττι κεν εἴπω, cf. Parm. B7.5-6: ἐξ 
accentuates the paradoxical and initially puzzling force of Heraclitus’ opening assertion that the 
lord whose oracle is in Delphi does not ‘say’ or ‘speak’. 
 
It might be objected that Apollo clearly gives whatever signs he does (σηµαίνει) by saying 
whatever he says in his oracles. Thus, by the time we get to the fragment’s last word, any initial 
puzzles are dispelled. We are reassured that Apollo does indeed speak and say things. Now, the 
suggestion that the lord at Delphi gives his signs or his signals (σηµαίνει) by saying what he says 
in his oracles is itself highly likely.16 Far from dispelling the paradox, however, this line of 
thought deepens it. If σηµαίνει indicates in this way that Apollo does say things in his oracles, 
then what does Heraclitus mean by also asserting that Apollo ‘does not say’? 
 
What are we to make of Heraclitus’ remark? Could the point be that it is the Pythia rather than 
Apollo who actually says things in the oracles? It is possible, although not clear, that Plutarch 
read οὔτε λέγει in this way.17 At any rate, such an interpretation would be untenable. First, B93 is 
focused throughout on ‘the lord whose oracle is the one in Delphi’ as the subject of the verbs and 
as a communicative agent. There is no suggestion in the verbs of a division-of-labour between 
Apollo and the Pythia. Second, Apollo gives us signs which demand interpretation because he 
refrains from doing whatever it is from which he refrains by neither saying nor concealing. But, 
on the proposed interpretation, the Pythia does what Apollo refrains from doing (λέγει), with the 
implausible consequence that we do get what Apollo himself will not give us (οὔτε λέγει) and 
that, therefore, careful and circumspect interpretation of his difficult signs is not, after all, 
necessary. We cannot, then, explain οὔτε λέγει by postulating an implicit contrast between 
Apollo’s role and the Pythia’s role. 
 
I suggest that Heraclitus’ paradox points in another direction. Heraclitus highlights the three 
verbs, λέγει, κρύπτει and σηµαίνει, but pointedly and tantalisingly refrains from specifying what 
they are directed towards in this connection. He begins by asserting that Apollo ‘does not say’ 
just after establishing and emphasising a context (‘the lord whose oracle is the one in Delphi’) 
which invites the initial reaction that surely there are some things which the god does say (i.e. the 
Delphic oracles themselves). In this way, Heraclitus impels us towards raising and reflecting on 
                                                                                                                                                  
ἐµέθεν ῥηθέντα). For the Pythia and others on Apollo as the speaker, cf. e.g. Hdt. 1.91 (προηγόρευε … εἶπε), 
6.80 (φάµενος), 8.36 (φάς), 8.122 (ἔφησε); cf. also Hom. Od. 8.79-80 (χρείων µυθήσατο), Tyrt. fr.4.1-2 (Φοίβου 
ἀκούσαντες Πυθωνόθεν οἴκαδ’ ἔνεικαν / µαντείας τε θεοῦ καὶ τελέεντ’ ἔπεα), Pl. Ion 534c7-d4. We also get 
references to oracles as themselves ‘saying’, e.g. Hdt. 6.77 (λέγον), 5.92β (λέγον); cf. the term λόγιον for 
‘oracle’, e.g. Hdt. 1.64, 4.178, 8.62, PW 103. 
16 Cf. e.g. Hdt. 7.142 where Apollo is taken to have given a sign gesturing towards the Athenian ships (ἔλεγον 
τὰς νέας σηµαίνειν τὸν θεόν) obviously by saying in his oracle what he said about the wooden wall. Cf. Powell, 
sv. σηµαίνω (6) for further passages in which the signalling or indicating of something (e.g. a historical cause 
(1.75) or a person (1.5)) is achieved through the use of words. Of course, non-verbal omens can equally ‘signal’, 
see e.g. Hdt. 1.78, 9.120. (In none of these passages is there any indication that the verb itself carries the force 
‘mean’ in the sense of a word’s or phrase’s semantic meaning. Contrast the later semantic use e.g. in Pl. Cratyl. 
393a6 (ὁ γὰρ ‘ἄναξ’ καὶ ὁ ‘ἕκτωρ’ σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν σηµαίνει); cf. further LSJ sv. σηµαίνω III.3.) 
17 So Fontenrose (1978: 238), who advances this as the correct interpretation of Heraclitus. After citing the 
fragment (with which he expects familiarity: οἶµαι δὲ σε γιγνώσκειν κτλ, Mor. 404d8), Plutarch comments: add 
to these words, which are well said, and think of the god of this place as using the Pythia for our hearing just as 
the sun uses the moon for our seeing (404e1-3). On Fontenrose’s reading, the further point which Plutarch adds 
is not that Apollo speaks to us through the Pythia (he has, ex hypothesi, already read that into Heraclitus’ οὔτε 
λέγει), but only the comparison with the sun’s diluting use of the moon. Alternatively, however, it may be that 
Plutarch’s added point is that Apollo speaks to us through the diluting medium of the Pythia (like the sun’s use 
of the moon), and that what he extracts from Heraclitus is the distinct (but congruent) point that Apollo 
withholds something in his oracles, leaving us with signs which somehow fall short of a full communication, in 
keeping with the general thrust of this passage in Plutarch that what we mortals get from Apollo is something 
less than the full force of his thought. 
the following question: what is it that the lord whose oracle is in Delphi does not say (λέγει) or 
conceal (κρύπτει) but for which he does give a sign or (to convey the structural equivalence of 
the Greek verbs) which he does ‘signal’ (σηµαίνει)? With regard to any Delphic oracle, there will 
be certain insights – a certain understanding, certain true propositions and useful injunctions – 
which the inquirer requires and at which the oracle places him in a position to arrive (say, the 
insight that, if we attack the Persians, we will destroy our own great kingdom, or at least the 
recognition that this is a very possible outcome). Heraclitus maintains that Apollo does not 
articulate or express those sought-after insights. Nor, however, does he conceal them. Instead, 
Apollo articulates and expresses other things (other statements, conditionals, questions, 
imperatives, interjections, riddling images, etc; say, the conditional that, if we attack the 
Persians, we will destroy a great kingdom). And these other things, which Apollo does say, will 
guide the cautious and attuned inquirer and place him in a position to arrive at those insights 
which he requires and which Apollo leaves categorically unspoken and unarticulated. It is in this 
sense that Apollo’s oracles act as signs for or ‘signal’ or ‘show’ (σηµαίνει) what we require from 
the oracle. And, equally, it is in this sense that we could say that what Apollo does is a way of 
communicating those insights. But Apollo’s mode of communication is precisely not (οὔτε λέγει) 
a way of saying (speaking, expressing, articulating) those insights. It is important to be clear on 
this point: B93 does not tell us that Apollo says in an indirect and obscure manner that which he 
signals. Rather, B93 tells us that Apollo does not say (indirectly, ambiguously, obscurely or 
otherwise: οὔτε λέγει) that which he signals (ἀλλὰ σηµαίνει). The force of σηµαίνει in B93 is 
conditioned by its contrast with the verbs λέγει and κρύπτει. Apollo neither says nor conceals 
but, instead, signals. The term σηµαίνει, then, indicates in the context of this configuration a 
different kind of communication: a communication which does not involve or overlap with 
saying or speaking that which is being communicated. On Heraclitus’ analysis, in sum, what 
Apollo tells you is not, in fact, the true answer to the inquiry which you put to the oracle. In 
speaking the oracle, Apollo tells you something else which, however, gestures towards that 
answer, serving as an orienting but also difficult and ambiguous18 starting point from which the 
mortal interpreter will then succeed or fail to arrive at the understanding he requires. 
 
Part of my suggestion, then, is that the force of the negations οὔτε λέγει and οὔτε κρύπτει is 
context-sensitive; it is determined and restricted by their contrast with the affirmation: ἀλλὰ 
σηµαίνει. Apollo neither says nor conceals precisely that for which he gives a sign. How might 
we make some sense (and, indeed, this question arises on any reading of οὔτε λέγει) of 
Heraclitus’ far from obvious affirmation that the lord in Delphi ‘does not conceal’? In Herodotus, 
κρύπτειν typically has the sense of taking deliberate action to keep something from view so as to 
prevent others from becoming aware of it, and it is this same sense of κρύπτειν in the active 
voice that we seem to get in Heraclitus B95: ἀµαθίην κρύπτειν ἄµεινον.19 In Herodotus, The 
object of concealment can be anything from a material thing (e.g. spoils from a battle, Hdt. 9.80; 
cf. 3.87, 3.133, 4.179) to an event or state-of-affairs. Cambyses and Prexaspes use the term to 
refer to their prolonged cover-up of the fact (πρῆγµα, 3.65) of Smerdis’ murder (3.65; 3.75). At 
one point, Prexaspes contrasts ‘concealing’ this affair with ‘saying what happened’ (κρύπτειν … 
λέγειν τὰ γενόµενα, 3.75). With this particular opposition, Prexaspes contrasts the idea of 
preventing others from becoming aware of the fact of Smerdis’ murder (κρύπτειν) with the idea 
of speaking and expressing this fact (λέγειν), not with the stronger and more qualified idea of 
                                                
18 By describing the oracle as ‘ambiguous’ here, I do not mean that it articulates or expresses the answer 
ambiguously. On Heraclitus’ account, the oracle (e.g. Croesus’ oracle) will be ambiguous in the sense that, by 
using it as a starting point for reflection, one could reasonably arrive at multiple and even competing 
conclusions (competing answers), none of which are themselves articulated in the oracle (ambiguously or 
otherwise: οὔτε λέγει). 
19 I noncommittally follow Robinson’s reconstruction of the original word order (1987: 56). 
speaking it in a direct or unambiguous manner.20 Heraclitus’ negations in B93 are, I suggest, best 
understood along not dissimilar lines. Apollo does not articulate or express in his oracles the 
insights and answers for which the consultants asked so as to make them instantly and easily 
available to them. Nor, however, does Apollo take positive and deliberate action in his oracles to 
ensure that the inquirers fail to become aware of those insights and answers. Rather, Apollo does 
something which falls in between those two actions. He articulates the oracles, which act as signs 
for those insights and answers in the sense discussed above. The statement that Apollo does not 
conceal is, again, tied to and restricted by the statements which flank it: the thrust of B93 is that 
Apollo neither speaks nor conceals that which he signals. 
 
I argued that Heraclitus’ remark about Apollo is puzzling and difficult on the most rudimentary 
level of its interpretation. By the same token, B93 does not simply state a principle that was 
already obvious if implicit in the traditions surrounding Delphic Apollo. Heraclitus’ remark 
comprises a creative and challenging theological encapsulation of Apollo’s modus operandi, 
which, nonetheless, preserves and appropriates the broad theological insight which the Delphic 
traditions implicitly convey concerning the interpretive predicament in which Apollo places his 
consultants. On Heraclitus’ analysis, Apollo does not in any manner articulate (οὔτε λέγει) that 
for which he, instead, gives a guiding but difficult and ambiguous sign. That is, the god does not 
speak those answers and insights for which the consultant asked and which he requires. This 
theological construal of Delphic Apollo is ingenious and far from obvious. A different observer 
of the same Delphic traditions could have plausibly arrived at the simpler conclusion (and, 
indeed, this is what the over-translations of Heraclitus’ stark and unqualified οὔτε λέγει are 
getting at) that the lord in Delphi does say that which he signals, only he says it in an indirect and 
equivocal manner. Did Apollo say to Croesus that, if he attacks the Persians, he will destroy his 
own great kingdom? Or, again, did he say to Arcesilaus that he must not burn the Cyrenaeans 
who fled to Aglomachus’ tower (see Hdt. 4.163-164)? On Heraclitus’ construal, the answer is 
‘no’. In saying to Croesus that, if he attacks, he will destroy a great kingdom, Apollo was saying 
nothing more or less than just that: if Croesus marches, he will destroy a great kingdom. Again, 
in issuing to Arcesilaus the puzzling injunction that, if he finds an oven full of jars, he should not 
bake the jars, what Apollo can be said to have told Arcesilaus on this point includes nothing 
more or less than this puzzling expression itself. Nonetheless, Apollo did signal those points 
which he left unsaid. These statements did respectively put Croesus in a position to attain the 
insight that he will be destroying his own kingdom (or, minimally, that this was a very possible 
outcome) and Arcesilaus in a position to recognise that he must not burn the Cyrenaeans in the 
tower. But a competing account of the selfsame oracles could be that Apollo did indeed tell 
Croesus – albeit very equivocally – that he will destroy his own kingdom and that he did indeed 
say to Arcesilaus – albeit very obscurely or figuratively – that he must not burn the Cyrenaeans 
in the tower. Indeed, this is the conception of Apollo’s oracles which the Pythia in Herodotus 
suggests when she rebukes a disgruntled Croesus for failing to ask which kingdom Apollo was in 
fact talking about in his oracle (χρῆν …ἐπειρέσθαι … κότερα τὴν ἑωυτοῦ ἢ τὴν Κύρου λέγοι 
ἀρχήν, 1.91).21 And this is the unsophisticated construal of Apollo which Heraclitus rejects when 
                                                
20 Herodotus in this passage and Heraclitus in B93 certainly could have contrasted ‘concealing’ with ‘saying 
clearly’ (using σαφηνέως, vel sim.), but, as it is, these two texts confront us with contrasts between κρύπτειν and 
a stark and unqualified λέγειν. Cf. n. 000 above. 
21 Cf. also Hdt. 3.64 (τὸ δὲ χρηστήριον … ἔλεγε ἄρα). Similarly, Pausanias writes regarding Epaminondas (who 
was warned to beware ‘πέλαγος’ and died in a wood called Pelagos): ‘but what the god said to him in advance 
(προέλεγεν) was the wood Pelagos and not the sea’, Paus. 8.11.10 = PW 258. The point will not be affected if 
we translate λέγοι in Hdt. 1.91 with ‘meant’. Herodotus will still be using the same verb for ‘mean’ which 
covers the sense ‘say’ or ‘tell’. That is, Herodotus’ point will be, not that this is what Apollo gestured and 
oriented Croesus towards by telling him something else in the oracle, but precisely that this is in fact what 
Apollo actually told Croesus in the oracle, that this is what the god actually said (λέγοι). Heraclitus, by contrast, 
he strikingly and strangely affirms that the god does not say – or conceal – but, instead, gives a 
sign.  
 
Fittingly, Heraclitus’ remark about Apollo is, on its most literal level, not as easy to decipher as 
it might seem to a reader who glossed over its precise wording and assumed that he was already 
familiar with the point to which it was alluding. Heraclitus’ encapsulation of Apollo’s mode of 
communication impels the reader who is attuned to its very deliberate and difficult formulation 
to theologise: to ask how we might gain some understanding by reflecting on the initially 
puzzling assertion that the lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither says nor conceals but, instead, 
gives a sign. 
 
 
HERACLITUS’ PARADOX 
Does the god Apollo present a paradigm of emulation for the mortal Heraclitus? If so, what is 
Apolline philosophical inquiry like? How might we understand the parallel sense in which 
Heraclitus neither says nor conceals but gives a sign? 
 
We could only avoid the implication that B93 generates a parallel paradox in the case of 
Heraclitus (does he not ‘say’ things?) if we denied that Apollo’s use of language is in fact a 
model for Heraclitus’ own.22 But that way-out would be implausible. Heraclitus’ style and the 
challenges it generates for active, reflective and careful interpretation – his authorial rhetoric and 
pronounced use of dense and pregnant paradoxes, word-plays, analogies, riddles and aphorisms – 
closely recall Apollo’s oracles.23 Lucian taps into long-standing perceptions of Heraclitus ‘the 
riddler’ (Timon apud D.L. 9.6) and ‘the dark’ (Strab. 14.25, Cic. de fin. 2.15) when he has his 
prospective buyer of philosophical lives exclaim to Heraclitus: Hey, are you telling riddles or 
putting together puzzles? You’re just like Loxias, you make nothing clear (vit. auct. 14.21-22).24 
The interpretive predicament of those facing Heraclitus’ deliberately crafted remarks fits closely 
the interpretive predicament which he himself diagnoses in B93 for those who must reflect on 
Apollo’s difficult signs. Heraclitus’ sayings offer orienting but difficult starting-points and 
points-of-reference from which, and between which, the capable reader must think critically and 
independently. In the opening to his book,25 Heraclitus emphasises that people ever fail to 
comprehend his account (ἀξύνετοι, B1). The trope of misinterpretation and mistaken inferences 
is of course central in the Delphic traditions. 
 
How, then, might Heraclitus understand his own use of language on the model of Apollo’s? In 
the light of our analysis of B93, the fragment again impels us to raise and reflect on the question: 
what is this string of verbs directed towards? What is it which Heraclitus neither says (οὔτε 
λέγει) nor conceals (οὔτε κρύπτει) but for which he, instead, gives a sign (ἀλλὰ σηµαίνει)? B93, 
again, does not tell us that Heraclitus articulates and expresses in an indirect and obscure way 
that which he signals. Rather, it tells us that Heraclitus does not articulate or express (indirectly, 
obscurely or otherwise: οὔτε λέγει) that which he signals. And, again, while there is, trivially, an 
                                                                                                                                                  
drives a wedge between what the god says in the oracle and what he gestures and orients his consultant towards 
by saying whatever he does say in it. 
 
22 Such denials are rare but not non-existent: Barnes 1983: 101; Dilcher 1995: 151. 
23 See Maurizio 2013 for an interesting examination of stylistic and compositional affinities between Heraclitus 
and Delphic oracles, especially as given in Herodotus; cf. Hölscher 1974: 229-31; Warren 2007: 59, Nightingale 
2007: 184. 
24 See further Guthrie 1962: 411-12 for ancient references to Heraclitus’ obscurity. 
25 The book most plausibly comprised a collection of brief, self-standing entries (probably significantly 
ordered), see Granger 2004; cf. Kahn 1979: 7; Warren 2007: 58-59. 
endless amount of things which are not said by Heraclitus in the fragments (or by Apollo in his 
oracles), what is at issue here is a particular subset of the things which Heraclitus does not say: 
those things which Heraclitus does not say (or conceal) in the fragments and for which he offers 
signs by saying what he does say.  
 
My suggestion, then, is that what Heraclitus does not say in the fragments, according to B93, is 
what he himself labels the ‘hidden nature’ or the ‘unseen attunement’ of things: Nature likes to 
hide (φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, B123); The unseen attunement is better than the evident one 
(ἁρµονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων, B54). In B93, Heraclitus recognises that he does not 
actually articulate or express in the fragments the hidden nature and unseen attunement of things 
so as to make them instantly and easily available to us (οὔτε λέγει).26 Nor (οὔτε κρύπτει) does 
Heraclitus take positive and deliberate action to ensure that we fail to grasp them (even though 
nature itself does have a proclivity to elude and frustrate recognition and comprehension: 
κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, B123). Rather (ἀλλὰ σηµαίνει), by confronting us with his words, Heraclitus 
guides and places the attuned inquirer in a position to arrive at insights into the measures and 
structures of balance and unity which underlie and frame the phenomena we encounter. But these 
measures and structures are themselves left unspoken in his words. 
 
Heraclitus’ practice in the fragments indeed seems to conform to the programmatic comment 
made in B93, understood along these lines. By way of illustration, Heraclitus does not proffer an 
account which itself articulates the nature of the relations between pairs of opposites. But his 
observation (B61) that the same thing, seawater, is both the purest water (for fish) and the foulest 
water (for humans) places us in a position to gain some insight into the hidden relations of unity 
and the unseen attunement which obtain between what we previously took to be the isolated and 
disjointed opposites of purity and impurity but which, in fact, jointly inhere at once in one and 
the same thing. Again, Heraclitus’ statement that fire and all things are exchangeable in the way 
that money and goods are exchangeable (B90) impels us to reflect, and (along with Heraclitus’ 
other remarks concerning the physical elements) guides and orients our reflections, about the 
structure of relations between the elements and fire’s special place in that structure. But this 
exercising analogy does not itself articulate those relations or that special place. It leaves those 
things unsaid. On the model of B93, Heraclitus’ remarks can have the status of second-order 
statements of certain principles about the underlying realities, and they can express observations 
about phenomena in a way that facilitates and guides reflection about the underlying realities, but 
they do not themselves articulate or express the nature of those realities for which they, instead, 
give signs.27 
 
                                                
26 Heraclitus, that is, does not ‘express’ the hidden nature if that means uttering words which in any way 
(indirectly or otherwise) capture or represent the hidden nature as part of their semantic force. Heraclitus’ 
words, rather, capture or represent something else, which, however, places the listener or reader in a position to 
acquire insights into the hidden nature and an understanding of it, in the manner of signs as discussed above. 
27 The rubrics of the hidden nature and unseen attunement will extend over what we might distinguish as the 
different (ontological, cosmological, theological, psychological, etc.) aspects of Heraclitus’ philosophical 
investigations. It is in giving his signs along the lines understood here that I take Heraclitus to be fulfilling his 
promise to ‘indicate’ or ‘show’ how each thing is (φράζων ὅκως ἔχει, B1). To take this promise to mean that 
Heraclitus will tell us or articulate or state how each thing is – hardly an obvious implication of φράζων – will 
conflict not only with B93 (οὔτε λέγει) but, more importantly, with what we actually get in the fragments. See 
further Svenbro 1988: 20-22 for a general discussion of the verb φράζειν. Svenbro (not discussing Heraclitus) 
shows that the fundamental sense of the verb is ‘show’ or ‘indicate’, rather than ‘say’, and that it is very close 
to, and can naturally be used as a functional equivalent for, σηµαίνειν and δηλοῦν. See e.g. Hom. Od. 19.250, 
23.206, 24.346; by contrast with saying something: Aesch. Ag. 1061; Hdt. 4.113 (ἔφραζε … σηµαίνουσα); of 
course, things can be ‘indicated’ or ‘shown’ through the medium of speech or writing, e.g. Eur. IT 761-63. 
An important consequence of this interpretation of Heraclitus’ appropriation of Apollo’s mode of 
communication is an interesting attitude on his part to the relation between the language he uses 
and the underlying realities which are the focus of his philosophical reflections. Heraclitus does 
not actually articulate or express those underlying measures and structures of balance and unity 
for which he gives signs. In this sense, there is a certain gap, which B93 recognises, between 
Heraclitus’ words and those underlying realities.28 
 
Heraclitus’ attitude to names offers an instructive parallel. For Heraclitus, names are significant. 
If properly interpreted, they yield an insight into the natures of their referents. It also seems, 
however, that names are always deficient: they never properly manage to express the unified 
natures of the things they name.29 The name of the bow is life (βίος), but its work is death (B48). 
The bow’s name itself discloses an affinity with life but fails to articulate the unified and 
complex nature of its referent. It is only by considering both the bow’s name and its function that 
we can appreciate holistically the interrelation of life and death in it. Again, the one wise thing 
both wants and does not want to be called by the name of ‘Zeus’ (λέγεσθαι … Ζηνὸς ὄνοµα, 
B32). I cannot explore here the possible reasons for this inclination and disinclination,30 but the 
same principle recurs: the name ‘Zeus’ yields an insight into some aspects of its referent but does 
not comprise an adequate articulation of its unified and complex nature. B67 appears to identify 
‘the god’ (ὁ θεός) with a series of opposites (day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety 
hunger). The fragment continues: it alters as when mixed with perfumes it gets named according 
to the pleasure of each one (ὀνοµάζεται καθ’ ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου).31 These different antithetical 
designations do circumscribe partial aspects of the divine, which come to light in its continuous 
permutations. But they do not even jointly exhaust the nature of divinity. Nor, it seems, could 
any name express that nature. 32 Heraclitus’ attitude to names, then, suggests a similar sort of 
gap. The names of things, somewhat reminiscently of the language which makes up Heraclitus’ 
fragments, will, if properly interpreted, help us to acquire insights into certain realities, but they 
do not themselves articulate or capture the complex, unified and whole natures of those 
realities.33 
                                                
28 Maurizio interestingly suggests that Heraclitus was inspired by the representations of equivocal language and 
its misinterpretation which he encountered in the Delphic traditions to reflect himself on ‘how words might or 
might not correspond to the world, and how language in its polyvalence might occlude the divine and hidden 
structure of the world’ (2013: 117-18, 114-15). Maurizio’s suggestion coheres nicely with my own 
interpretations but proceeds along entirely different lines. Maurizio does not offer an analysis of the language 
and specifics of B93 itself: she cites the fragment (100) and proceeds on the assumption that the rudimentary 
sense of Heraclitus’ remark about Apollo is itself self-evident and requires no further discussion (cf. n.000 
above). Beyond the remarks cited here, moreover, Maurizio does not explicate in further detail precisely how 
she construes Heraclitus’ conception of the relation between language and reality. 
29 I follow Kirk 1962: 116-22 on both points.  
30 For one thing, the name again captures the referent’s affinity with life (ζῆν) but neglects the concomitant 
opposite death, cf. Kahn 1979: 270-71. 
31 Kahn 1979: 276-80 argues convincingly against inserting πῦρ (or some other noun) after ὅκωσπερ. Anyway, 
with the supplement, the point about naming (ὀνοµάζεται κτλ) would still bear also on ‘the god’. 
32 On this point in B67, cf. similarly Dilcher 1995: 124-25. 
33 On Heraclitus’ attitude to names – in particular to the naming of gods – see further Rowett 2013: 180-87. 
Rowett (184) notes that, in B93, Heraclitus fixes the reference to Apollo through a description of his status and 
the location of his oracle rather than through the use of his name (Socrates does something similar at Pl. Apol. 
20e7-8 as well as Xen. Mem. 4.3.16), and interestingly relates this feature of the fragment to what she identifies 
as a general religious worry in Heraclitus and elsewhere about calling or failing to call the gods by the right 
names. Indeed, we may relate it particularly to the questions which, as we saw just now, Heraclitus seems to 
raise concerning the very capacity of the divine names we use (B32, B67) to do justice to the nature of what 
they name and not to fragment divinity in very partial ways (a similar concern may be involved in Heraclitus’ 
assertion in B15 that what we call ‘Hades’ and ‘Dionysus’ are, in fact, one and the same); on this point, cf. 
Rowett 2013: 187. 
 
Heraclitus’ approach to sensory experiences offers a further instructively comparable gap. 
Indeed, scholars have not implausibly found in B93 an implicit programmatic remark about our 
encounters, not only with Heraclitus’ text, but also with the perceptible world around us.34 We 
saw that Heraclitus speaks of a hidden nature (B123) and an unseen as opposed to perceptible 
attunement (ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων, B54).35 Nonetheless, our sensory experiences, if properly 
interpreted, do yield insights into those underlying realities: All those things of which there is 
sight, hearing, learning from experience: these I prefer (B55). Again, Heraclitus’ statement that 
Eyes and ears are poor witnesses for men if they have barbarian souls (B107) implies that these 
organs are not poor witnesses for those possessed of the right kind of souls.36 Scholars have long 
observed that the term ‘barbarian’ conceptualises the failure to make proper use of the evidence 
given in what one sees and hears as the failure to understand a language.37 Perceptible 
phenomena comprise a kind of language, which the mortal interpreter can succeed or fail to 
comprehend and from which he can succeed or fail to gain understanding. But (as with names) 
there is a gap between our sensory experiences and those hidden and unseen realities for which 
they serve as signs. Perceptible phenomena do not, then, themselves display (or articulate) those 
realities, which remain unseen and never immediately available. Nonetheless, by intelligently 
reflecting on our sensory experience as signs for those underlying realities, we are able to gain 
some insight into them. 
 
The Apolline Heraclitus who emerged so far is conscious of a gap between the language he uses 
and the hidden and unseen realities for which this language gives signs but which, importantly, it 
does not articulate. This conscious attitude conforms to Heraclitus’ actual practice in the 
fragments and is reminiscent of his attitude to the status and heuristic value of names and sensory 
experiences. Now, to an extent, these conclusions run counter to the standard approach which 
emphasises that, for Heraclitus, there is a correspondence, structural similarity, equivalence, or 
even identity between language and reality.38 Mourelatos argues powerfully that Heraclitus takes 
pioneering strides towards a view of reality as not a mere aggregate of things which alternately 
gain and cede territory but a coherent, harmonious and intelligible system of relations which, as 
such, shares some of the features of intelligent discourse.39 It is important, and no accident, that 
Heraclitus uses the one term logos with respect both to his words and to the underlying measures 
and structures of balance, proportion, order and unity inherent in things (that is, to the ‘hidden 
nature’ and ‘unseen attunement’ themselves).40 
                                                
34 Esp. Hölscher 1974: 231-34, cf. e.g. Curd 1991: 541. 
35 In this respect, Kahn 1979: 107 seems wrong to speak of our ‘direct experience of the nature of things’. Our 
direct experiences are of perceptible things, which are related to the unseen attunement and hidden nature which 
underlie them in the manner of signs. 
36 Sensory experiences thus appear to be necessary but insufficient for understanding, Kahn 1979: 106; Hussey 
1982: 34; Graham 2008: 177; cf. B40. 
37 E.g. Hussey (loc. cit.); Graham (loc. cit.). 
38 E.g. Hölscher 1974: 234, 238; Mourelatos 2008: 322-23 with n. 63; Emlyn-Jones 1976: 97-98, 101, 
Mackenzie 1988: 18; Graham 2008: 177, 183; Long 2009: 108-109; Hülsz 2013: 292. Rankin 1994 rejects the 
view that Heraclitus takes his language to mimic or mirror or somehow match reality, ‘which he intuited as 
effectively indescribable in natural language’ (78). He still seems to hold, though, that Heraclitus’ words strive 
to ‘represent’ reality, but not pictorially or in any kind of straightforward or direct way (71, 74, 77). 
39 Mourelatos 2008 (1973): 317-24. 
40 I take this point (which is not required for my central arguments in this paper) for granted here. See Long 
2009 for an excellent treatment of Heraclitus’ logos; see also Johnstone 2014; Hülsz 2013; cf. Kahn e.g. on B1 
(1979: 97-98) and B45 (128-130); Mourelatos 2008: 322; Hussey 1982: 56-57; Warren 2007: 61-62; 
Nightingale 2007: 185. Some scholars argue that there is no warrant for taking Heraclitus’ logos to involve any 
sort of cosmic significance or indeed to refer to anything beyond his own account or discourse, see e.g. Sedley 
1992: 32 with n.28; Sedley 2007: 226, n.49. I cannot properly address this question here. It seems difficult to 
 
My arguments here are entirely compatible with Heraclitus’ marked dual use of logos and with 
Mourelatos’ contention. They require us to qualify rather than discard the view that Heraclitus 
perceives a kind of affinity between language and reality. Heraclitus’ Apolline attitude to the 
relation between his language and the unseen realities is, I suggest, more nuanced and complex 
than the traditional unqualified and one-sided emphasis on this affinity will allow. Both 
Heraclitus’ language and the realities which are the focus of his philosophical reflections 
comprise coherent, harmonious and intelligible systems of relations. This affinity is pointedly 
highlighted by Heraclitus’ dual use of logos. Heraclitus’ deliberate style and the interpretive 
challenges it generates, moreover, are an important part of what makes engaging with his sayings 
an invaluable preparatory exercise for becoming attuned to the cosmic logos. By engaging with 
Heraclitus’ dense and many-layered sayings, we prepare ourselves for engaging with our 
perceptual experiences of things, not superficially or at face value, but as signs for something 
else; we thus acquire the ability to become aware of, and attuned to, the unseen structures of 
unity and order which underlie our perceptual experiences but are not displayed in them.41 At the 
same time, however, Heraclitus does not naively imagine that the language he uses (his logos, his 
sayings) itself formulates, or somehow coincides or is identical with, those unseen structures of 
reality (the cosmic logos). He recognises – quite correctly – that his sayings do not actually put 
into words the nature of those unseen realities but, instead, give signs for them. Heraclitus, then, 
is also keenly aware of the distinction and, indeed, the gap (somewhat reminiscent of the gap 
between human names and the natures of their referents) between that logos which is his words 
and the cosmic logos which is the unseen measures and structures of unity and attunement 
inherent in things. Heraclitus’ injunction: Listening not to me but to the logos, it is wise to agree 
(ὁµολογεῖν) that all things are one (B50) calls attention to, among other things, this very 
distinction and gap. Listening to what Heraclitus says is not our ultimate goal. It is an exercise 
designed to render us attuned to another kind of logos, which Heraclitus’ own logos does not 
itself articulate. It is to be attuned to and in harmony with this other logos (ὁµολογεῖν) in how we 
think and act and in what we say (and refrain from trying to say: οὔτε λέγει) that is our ultimate 
goal.42 
 
As a final note, I tentatively suggest – although I would not press this suggestion – that, on a 
deeper level of interpretation, we may find in Heraclitus’ οὔτε λέγει a nod to logos (a term of art 
for Heraclitus). By affirming that he does not λέγει – does not produce a logos – Heraclitus may 
be acknowledging that, while his ‘signs’ of course amount to a logos (his logos, his sayings), he 
does not articulate, and his signs are not equivalent to, that logos which inheres in things 
themselves and which is the ultimate object of our interest. In that sense, Heraclitus indeed does 
not issue a logos. Elsewhere too Heraclitus arguably uses the verb in a way that evokes his term 
of art logos.43 Furthermore, the upshot that, in different senses, Heraclitus both does and does not 
issue a logos (that his logos is at the same time not a logos) would correspond to similar thought-
patterns elsewhere in the fragments.44 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
square the minimalist interpretation with the assertion in B2 that the logos is ‘common’ and with the indication 
in B1 that the logos is or holds good forever (ἐόντος ἀεί) and that people ever fail (and so could, in principle, 
avoid failing) to understand it (ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι) both before hearing and once they had heard; cf. also the soul’s 
‘deep logos’ in B45. 
41 For the idea that Heraclitus’ sayings serve as preparatory exercises for engaging properly with sensory 
experiences, see esp. Graham 2008: 177-81. 
42 I return to B50 below. 
43 B32 (λέγεσθαι … ὄνοµα), B114 (ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας κτλ), with Kahn 1979: 269-70, 117. 
44 B10 (συλλάψιες· ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, κτλ), B32 (οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει), B61 (καθαρώτατον καὶ µιαρώτατον), 
B125 (ἴσταται κινούµενος, following Mackenzie 1986). 
 
APOLLINE AND HERACLITEAN SIGNS: THE ANALOGY AND ITS LIMITS 
What we found in B93 can be described as a distinctive and idiosyncratic kind of imitatio dei. 
Heraclitus’ creative and involved theological reflection about Apollo and his use of language 
served for him as a framework within which to think about his own use of language and the 
nature of his inquiry. What does Apolline philosophical inquiry look like? Heraclitus, we saw, 
ascribed to Apollo, and adopted from him, a mode of communication in which the most 
important things – the insights and answers we are really after – are the ones that get left unsaid. 
Heraclitus’ very appeal to Apollo as a paradigm of emulation, however, raises the question: what 
are the scope and limits of the implicit analogy in B93 between man and god? To what extent 
does Heraclitus place himself in relation to his audience in the same position which Apollo 
occupies in relation to his? In what ways does the business of giving and receiving signs differ in 
the two cases? 
 
Apollo could say what he does not say. He decided to tell Croesus what he did tell him and not to 
tell him that, if he attacks, he will destroy his own great kingdom. This decision puts mortals in 
their place. It reflects and, to an extent, determines the mortal condition and the power-relations 
which frame the interactions between gods and men.45 In Hesiod’s Theogony, Zeus, after his 
victory over Kronos, takes the stone, which Rhea had passed off to Kronos as the new-born Zeus 
and which led to Kronos’ downfall and to Zeus’ ascension (485-491), and fixes it under 
Parnassus, in ‘sacred Pytho’: to be a sign (σῆµα) thereafter, a marvel (θαῦµα) for mortal human 
beings (498-500). The choice of Delphi can hardly be accidental.46 Zeus presents to mortal men 
the stone – the instrument and symbol of divine deception, itself a verisimilitudinous but 
specious counterfeit which was passed off as the genuine article (cf. Th. 27-28) – as the emblem 
of his new cosmic rule and the epitome of the dynamic which governs the communication 
between mortal and divine. Heraclitus need not be implying every aspect of this theological 
tradition, but he does draw on it. Apollo’s decision to give signs instead of saying or concealing 
is part of what determines his place as a god and the place of those who consult him as mortals. 
 
We need not deny altogether that, through the implicit analogy with Apollo, Heraclitus situates 
himself in a related position of superiority over his audience. Heraclitus issues signs, we struggle 
with them.47 But could Heraclitus have said what he does not say? We may distinguish two 
possible responses here. On one view (call it the ‘pedagogical’ interpretation), Heraclitus decides 
not to articulate the hidden nature and unseen attunement because he holds that proper 
understanding and philosophical enlightenment should involve us in an active effort of 
circumspect and creative reflection, for which his remarks should offer only orienting and 
framing starting-points and points-of-reference.48 On the other view (say, the ‘ontological’ 
interpretation), Heraclitus takes it that our language is inherently incapable of articulating or 
expressing the hidden nature and unseen attunement. On this view too, Heraclitus still holds that 
philosophical enlightenment demands an active effort of circumspect and creative reflection for 
which his remarks offer only signs. But now this pedagogical stance stems in the first instance 
from a certain conception of the nature of reality and from the subsequent view that it would not 
be possible to put into words the hidden nature and unseen attunement. Nothing in the fragments 
                                                
45 Merlan 1949: 429 took the key point of B93 to be the expression of a hierarchical relationship which involves 
ambiguity on the part of gods and risk on the part of mortals. 
46 For ‘sacred Pytho’ and Apolline divination, cf. Hom. Od. 8.79-81, h.Hom. 24.1-2; with West 1966: 303. 
47 Maurizio 2013: 116-17 detects similarities in the rhetorical ways in which Heraclitus in the fragments and 
Apollo in Delphic oracles construct their authority by disdainfully contrasting their own knowledge with their 
audience’s ignorance and with established authorities. 
48 Plotinus appears to have understood Heraclitus along these lines (Enn. 4.8.1.11-17). 
excludes either view. Heraclitus’ reflections, though, on the gap between our experiences and 
words on the one hand, and the hidden and unseen realities on the other (as discussed above), 
incline me towards the ontological interpretation. It seemed to be an inherent and irremediable 
limitation of our language, that the names which we use cannot express the unified natures of 
their referents, and of our perceptual experiences, that they do not themselves display the hidden 
and unseen realities which underlie them. After the event, it is often easy to say what it was that 
Apollo refrained from saying in his oracle (or, on a non-Heraclitean account of Apollo, to say 
clearly what it was that the god said only obscurely). Indeed, such post eventum realisations are a 
recurrent trope in the Delphic traditions (e.g. Hdt. 6.80). There is no parallel to this change ‘after 
the event’ with Heraclitus’ signs. The unseen attunement which is the focus of our philosophical 
reflections never comes to light and seems always to stay at the same distance from our cognitive 
and expressive capacities. Heraclitus is not, after all, in the business of giving oracles in anything 
like the normal sense, and it would not be surprising if the analogy between man and god was 
limited precisely when it came to the factors and constraints which determine Heraclitus’ use of 
language as opposed to Apollo’s. (In suggesting that Heraclitus opts for his mode of 
communication because any other would falsify the nature of reality, I am in agreement with a 
standard take on B93.49 I diverge from this standard take in my understanding of what this mode 
of communication amounts to. It is not an indirect and riddling way of capturing or expressing 
the nature of reality in words.50 Rather, Heraclitus neither speaks (indirectly or otherwise: οὔτε 
λέγει) nor conceals (οὔτε κρύπτει) the nature of the hidden realities. He resorts to his many-
layered, paradoxical and riddling sayings as a way of, instead, giving signs (ἀλλὰ σηµαίνει, as 
discussed above) which facilitate reflection about, insight into and an understanding of that 
which could not be said). 
 
What kind of attitude led to Croesus’ error and is reflected in it? How does one become better at 
listening to Apollo? Whatever else, Croesus’ engagement with the oracle is characterised by 
thinking about it (i) only superficially and without considering that it may not suggest what it 
appears to suggest at first glance and (ii) in a self-serving and self-centred manner.51 The 
assertion that, if he marches, Croesus ‘will destroy’ (καταλύσειν, Hdt. 1.53) a great kingdom is 
compatible with him destroying either his own kingdom or the Persians’ but, at first glance, 
rather suggests the latter. Croesus is further inclined to this interpretation by assuming that the 
oracle is spoken from his own partial perspective on things rather than from a synoptic, divine 
perspective for which his own kingdom and the Persians’ are entirely on a par.52 Above all, 
Croesus fails to recognise what kind of communication he is facing in the oracle. He fails to 
recognise that there is a serious and perhaps undecidable interpretive dilemma at play and (on 
Heraclitus’ account) that what Apollo told him was not actually the answer itself, but an 
ambiguous starting point from which to work towards the answer. The Delphic traditions do not 
afford a set of universal or specific rules for a correct interpretive procedure which will guarantee 
success. They do, however, convey and inculcate certain broad methodological principles, not 
least through figures like Croesus, who dramatise transgressions of those principles. The 
                                                
49 E.g. Hölscher 1974: 233-34; Kahn 1979: 124; Rankin 1994: 78 (cf. n. 000 above); Granger 2004: 8, n.17; 
Nightingale 2007: 183. 
50 Contrast Hölscher (loc. cit.): ‘[h]is language, too, must be one of paradox, simile, and riddle, precisely insofar 
as it seeks to proclaim the essence of what is’ (my emphases); Kahn (loc. cit.): ‘to speak plainly about such a 
subject would be to falsify it in the telling’; Nightingale (loc. cit.): Heraclitus had to find ‘a new language in 
which to articulate [the world’s] deep and divine structure’. 
51 Herodotus picks up on both points when he says that the oracle was ‘specious’ or ‘deceitful’ (κιβδήλου) and 
that Croesus supposed that it was favourable to him (ἐλπίσας πρὸς ἑωυτοῦ, Hdt. 1.75). The same two factors are 
emphatic e.g. in Cleomenes’ misinterpretation at Hdt. 6.76-80. 
52 On this point, cf. Manetti 1993: 28. 
traditions thus exercise a kind of habituation: they condition us to think about and listen to 
Apollo’s communications in the right ways.53 
 
Heraclitus’ sayings – and especially B93 itself as a second-order, programmatic statement – 
exercise a similar kind of habituation.54 They condition us to engage with them – and with the 
phenomenal world around us – not superficially or at face value but by reading and re-reading, 
with a careful view to different possible directions and with an ear for nuance and detail. In this 
way, Heraclitus’ sayings teach us how to ‘listen’ (B1, B19, B34, B50, B108). Again, they impel 
us to think about, say, seawater (B61) or gold (B9) no less from the perspective of fish and 
donkeys than of humans. More generally, they disabuse us of our deep-seated myopic and 
parochial inclinations. They condition us to work towards a viewpoint which is oriented towards 
not the ‘private’ but the ‘common’ (understood as what is universal and universally available – 
the cosmic logos – as opposed to the partial province of a limited perspective) and which strives 
towards the divine, synoptic view of things (B2, B72, B89, B113, B114, B41, B102). Heraclitus’ 
constant references to the exegetical and philosophical failings of his readers, contemporaries 
and predecessors (e.g. B1, B2, B17, B19, B34, B40, B56, B57, B72, B104, B108) serve – in 
place of a Croesus – as negative paradigms illustrating how not to approach his sayings or our 
experiences of the world.55 In all this we find further aspects of Heraclitus’ affinities with, and 
appropriations of, Apollo and the theological traditions surrounding him and his mode of 
communication.56 
 
Putting aside Croesus’ attitudinal flaws, what in fact determines whether our inferences from the 
oracle in any particular case are the right or wrong ones to draw seems to be whether the god 
would consider them right or wrong. The question is whether we have correctly ascertained 
divine will. In what sense does Apollo’s oracle constitute a sign which points towards the 
proposition ‘if I attack, I will destroy my own kingdom’ any more than towards the proposition 
‘if I attack, I will destroy the Persians’ kingdom’?57 What makes the former proposition but not 
the latter a correct inference from the sign – i.e. a successful interpretation of what it is a sign for 
– is that it would be a correct decipherment of divin will. Apollo would consider it a successful 
inference. The former proposition is the one that, in this sense, Apollo signalled (even while he 
did not actually speak it) and that Croesus would have, in this particular case, correctly 
inferred.58 There is arguably a disanalogy here with Heraclitus. It is not what Heraclitus thinks or 
wills which determines whether the conclusions and insights which we derived from his signs 
were the right ones to derive, but only whether these conclusions and insights cohere with the 
hidden nature and unseen attunement. I suggested above that Heraclitus’ injunction listening not 
to me but to the logos… (B50) calls attention to the distinction between his own logos and the 
cosmic logos. On a more rudimentary level of interpretation, however, we can also read this 
fragment as driving a wedge between Heraclitus himself and his own logos. What Heraclitus 
                                                
53 Croesus himself is ultimately habituated to some extent. After hearing the Pythia’s defense of Apollo’s 
conduct, he comes to see that the mistake was his and not the god’s (Hdt. 1.91). Cf. Kindt 2012: 50-51 on 
Parmeniscus’ enlightenment. 
54 We saw above how engaging with Heraclitus’ sayings can be thought of as a preparatory exercise for 
engaging with the world. 
55 Contra Maurizio 2013: 117, who writes that there is no parallel in Heraclitus for an interpreter’s incompetent 
alter ego such as Croesus. 
56 I cannot address here Heraclitus’ reflections on inquiries into oneself (B101, B116) as another sort of 
appropriative engagement with Delphi; on this point see Maurizio 2013: 115. 
57 This question can be raised whether we construe the oracle as an ambiguous articulation of the answer or 
(with Heraclitus) as an ambiguous sign, which does not itself articulate the answer at all (cf. n. 000 above). 
58 For (Apolline) oracles as affording an insight into divine will, cf. e.g. the Homeric Hymn to Apollo 130-132, 
539a. 
himself thinks or wills, or his authority, is not a criterion which determines whether or not we 
have used his words (his logos) properly. Heraclitus’ sayings may offer an observation which 
transmits warrant to a certain conclusion (as with the observation that seawater is life-giving for 
fish but destructive for humans, B61), or make a bare assertion which invites and orients 
reflection (as with the assertion that the one wise thing both wishes and does not wish to be 
called ‘Zeus’, B32). But, in all cases, our use of these signs will be more or less successful just to 
the extent that it renders us more or less attuned to and aware of the hidden realities (not to the 
extent that we have used them as Heraclitus intended). In another arguable contrast with Apollo’s 
signs, moreover, more than one successful answer or interpretive inference can be correlated 
with a Heraclitean sign. It is true that Heraclitus was aware of and preoccupied with riddles as 
we know them (B56 relates Homer’s failure to solve a riddle posed by children) and it is 
plausible that the model of the riddle held some programmatic significance for him in relation to 
the proper way to approach his signs. But we cannot accept the model of the riddle as an entirely 
appropriate one on which to understand Heraclitus’ sayings.59 The fragments can raise in a less 
determinate way different questions on different levels and lead to and accommodate multiple 
possible elaborations as severally legitimate.60 Nor should we imagine that behind every single 
terse remark by Heraclitus lies a highly specific and fully worked-out position or theory to be 
reconstructed by the reader, as opposed to, at least in some cases, views and insights of a more 
general and even vague nature (say, concerning different ways in which opposites may be 
interrelated and inter-dependent).61 In these respects, Heraclitus’ signs can arguably be more 
open-ended and underdetermined than Apollo’s. 
 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
In the first instance, I argued that B93 poses a theological reflection which is paradoxical and 
difficult on the most rudimentary level of its interpretation. It impels the attuned reader to 
theologise, to ask what insight about Apollo and his mode of communication we can reach by 
reflecting on the initially puzzling assertion that the lord whose oracle is the one in Delphi 
neither says nor conceals but gives a sign. Correspondingly, Heraclitus’ relation to, and 
engagement with, the more implicit theology of the Delphic traditions is more complex than 
previously assumed. B93 does not simply state a theological principle that was already obvious if 
implicit in the traditions about Apollo. Heraclitus advances a creative and far from obvious 
theological analysis of Apollo’s modus operandi, which, nonetheless, preserves and appropriates 
the broad theological conception, conveyed in the traditions, of the interpretive predicament 
generated by Apollo’s oracles. In the second instance, we saw how Heraclitus’ involved 
theological meditation on Apollo served for him as a framework within which to think in parallel 
ways about his own mode of communication and about the relation between his language and the 
realities which are the focus of his philosophical reflections. Indeed, we saw that Heraclitus’ 
appropriation of Apollo in this regard as a paradigm of emulation (a kind of imitatio dei which, 
as we also saw, had its particular scope and limits) is illuminating and important for 
understanding these central aspects of his thought. What Heraclitus creatively identified in the 
god, and what he creatively appropriated from him, was above all a mode of communication and 
inquiry on which the most important things – the insights and answers we are really after – are 
                                                
59 Contra Gallop 1989; Maurizio 2013: 103, 106, cf. also comments in Hölscher 1974: 233, 238; Hussey 1982: 
55-56; Graham 2008: 182. 
60 Kahn 1979: 91-92 makes a similar point about interpreting Heraclitus, precisely by contradistinction with 
interpreting oracles. 
61 Schofield 1991: 14-21, 32-34 develops some similar methodological caveats. It is entirely consistent with the 
remarks made above that we are sometimes warranted in ascribing to Heraclitus certain determinate views or 
theories, a point on which Betegh 2013: 227 rightly insists. 
the ones that get left unsaid. More generally, Heraclitus found in (Apolline) divination an 
instructive preoccupation with the problem of how limited mortals may gain some insight into 
matters which lie beyond their perceptual experience, control or even expressive capacities; with 
the pitfalls which attend the process of acquiring such insights from bits of language or 
experience which proffer only ambiguous starting points rather than the answers themselves, and 
with the critical and contemplative skills of reading and listening which enable one to engage in 
this process in the ideal way.62 
 
Heraclitus has often been portrayed as an enemy of traditional religious thought and practice.63 
Conversely, some scholars argue that fragments, which have traditionally been taken to convey 
such criticisms, in fact criticise misguided and misleading attitudes towards traditional religious 
practices and their associated patterns of thought rather than those practices and patterns of 
thought themselves.64 I cannot consider here in a general way Heraclitus’ engagements with 
traditional religious thought and practice or address the complex textual problems which the 
relevant fragments pose. I only dogmatically state my view that we would be wrong to look for a 
systematic or universal approach here on Heraclitus’ part, or to imagine that he ever conceived of 
traditional religious thought and practice as a unified and circumscribed whole to which one 
could take an approving or disapproving attitude.65 It is indeed difficult to find in Heraclitus’ 
assertion that corpses are more to be chucked out than faeces (B96) anything less than ‘a studied 
insult to ordinary Greek sentiment.’66 Conversely, B93 – as we examined it – offers a powerful 
counter-example to Wildberg’s general assessment that ‘one gets indeed the impression that 
[Heraclitus] regarded religious thought and talk as the product of a sorely deficient ratio, to 
which he offers his own dialectic as an antidote.’67 Heraclitus did not merely devote involved 
theological and philosophical reflection to Delphic Apollo: he appropriated his divination as a 
normative theological framework within which to understand the very nature of his own 
dialectic.68 
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